Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP is investigating securities fraud claims on behalf of all persons or entities who invested in Oppenheimer funds, among others:
- Oppenheimer AMT-Free Municipals Fund (OMFCX, OPTAX, OTFBX) between May 8, 2006 to October 21, 2008;
- Oppenheimer California Municipal Bond Fund (OPCAX, OCABX, and OCACX) between September 27, 2006 and November 28, 2008;
- Oppenheimer Rochester National Municipals Fund (ORNAX, ORNBX, ORNCX ) between March 17, 2006 and October 21, 2008;
- Oppenheimer New Jersey Municipal Fund (ONJAX, ONJBX, ONJCX) between April 24, 2006 and October 21, 2008;
- Oppenheimer Pennsylvania Municipal Fund (OPABX, OPACX, OPATX) between November 28, 2005 to November 28, 2008.
- Oppenheimer Core Bond Fund (OPIGX, OPBYX, OPBNX, OPBCX, OIGBX) traceable to the April 27, 2007 and April 29, 2008 offerings;
Oppenheimer funds and certain of their officers and directors violated federal securities laws by issuing false and misleading statements as to the funds' overall strategy and investment objectives in the funds' prospectuses. Unknown to most clients, the funds were defacto hedge funds, investing in extraordinarily risky derivatives that were highly illiquid.
The Oppenheimer Core Bond Fund was represented as conservative and appropriate as "a long-term investment" and as "part of a retirement plan portfolio." The Fund was also promoted as appropriate for, and was offered by, certain 529 college savings plans, such as those in Oregon, Texas, Maine, Illinois and New Mexico. In fact, the Fund is believed to have exceeded its own risk controls by investing in high-risk, highly leveraged bets that directly conflicted with its stated conservative strategy. As a result of this risky strategy, the Core Bond Fund lost more than 35 percent of its value in 2008 and another 10 percent in the first three months of 2009.
The Oppenheimer California Municipal Bond Fund was represented as a "mutual fund that seeks as high a level of current interest income as is consistent with preservation of capital." In fact, the Fund's investment policies were formulated and its operations were conducted virtually in complete disregard for preservation of capital. As a result of the Fund's overexposure to low-grade bonds, junk bonds, high-risk securities, and the California real estate market, during the Class Period, the Fund lost 45% of its net asset value.
The Oppenheimer Rochester National Municipals Fund employed strategies which enhanced its reported returns while exposing the Fund to a greater risk of price declines in the value of its portfolio securities in the event of any illiquidity in the market for municipal securities. At the same time, the prospectuses and other sales materials employed in selling and marketing the Fund failed to disclose that these very strategies exposed the Fund to substantially greater risk of loss due to Rochester Fund being forced to sell large blocks of portfolio securities at disadvantageous times and prices reduced from those at which the securities were previously carried on Rochester Fund's books.
The Oppenheimer New Jersey Municipal Fund failed to disclose that its use of derivative instruments known as "inverse floaters" which, under certain conditions, could (and did) effectively force the Fund to sell securities from its portfolio regardless of market conditions. In or around October 2008, the Fund filed a prospectus supplement alerting investors of the true risks of its investments -- the same risks that existed in 2006, 2007, and throughout 2008. By October 2008, however, those risks had already manifested themselves dealing substantial losses to investors causing shares to lose approximately 30% of their net asset value between January 2008 and October 2008.
The Oppenheimer Pennsylvania Municipal Fund misled investors about the Fund's investment objectives, policies and the underlying risk by characterizing its investments as consistent with preservation of capital. Specifically, contrary to the overarching principle of capital preservation, the Fund concentrated large positions in low rated bonds, bonds not reviewed by an independent rating agency and high risk securities including, Tobacco Bonds, Dirt Bonds, and Inverse Floaters. As a result, the Fund lost over 33% of its net asset value in 2008 compared with an average peer group loss of approximately 9.5%.
If you purchased shares of any of the above-listed Oppenheimer funds and wish to represent a class of investors in this action or have questions concerning this notice or your rights, please contact us.
CONTACT: Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP